Operation Jubilee Case Study

On July 30, 2008, a bloody battle involving Coalition forces took place in the mountainous eastern Afghan province of Nuristan. This was the Battle of Wanat and the devastating amount of Coalition casualties began a vigorous investigation by the United States Army. The village of Wanat, defended by Second Platoon, Chosen Company, Second Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team would fall victim to numerous bad decision made by higher command. Although the men of Chosen Company fought hard, they ended up surrounded, vastly outnumbered, and without any Battalion assets. This paper will argue the reasons for the disastrous outcome of the Battle of Wanat; examining the effective company leadership exploiting effective

The Battle of Dieppe, or Operation Jubilee, was a calculated collaborative allied infantry and naval attack in an attempt to take the port of Dieppe and the surrounding beaches. Before David O’Keefe’s scholarly contribution to the events surrounding Dieppe, it was largely understood that Dieppe was a trial run for amphibious attacks against the German front in France. It was seen as a huge disaster as sixty-eight percent of allied soldiers that engaged the Germans were either killed or wounded. There is a multitude of reasons as to why the number of casualties were so high. The most apparent of which being that the port, and surrounding beaches, were heavily guarded with artillery, machine guns, barbed wire, and German soldiers.

It was planned that the allied troops will “fake” a massive attack which will make Germans think that a final battle was happening at a port of France called Calais. Canada was the only division that penetrated farther than any other allied force. With over 14, 000 remaining soldiers on Juno Beach with 340 killed Canadians, 574 wounded and 47 captured, the Canadians bravely fought and for success (Hoogeveen 300). Surprisingly, casualties were minimal which showed that Canadian soldiers were the most effective in taking over the beach of Normandy with more soldiers invading the beach. This was also the battle which gave them the most of the recognition.

In the summer 1942, Stalin wanted to give a comprehensive attack, and the leader of America thought they would prepare it at 1943, but Churchill thought these times were to early. He thought Germany were very strong, if they direct attacked French beach, they would get a big hurt. Dieppe had limited way to against a strong German defend that it also improved Churchill’s opinion. He believed that they would lose this battle, and this was why he did not use England’s troop to attack Dieppe. Then, Canadian troops were going fight this battle.

The first lesson that the Allied forces learned was the fact that they needed to establish better communication systems between the Allied commanders and their troops. Canadian general Graham Crerar said, “The Dieppe raid helped us develop better communication systems which saved many men’s lives in Normandy” (Humphreys, 231).With the new communication system, the Allied commanders were able to execute the Invasion of Normandy successfully (Humphreys, 232). The new communication system continued to be useful at the operations following the Invasion of Normandy as well. Thus, if the Dieppe raid wasn’t executed, the Allied forces would not have created a new communication system, and the results at Normandy would have resembled the abominable results at

Mission command and understanding the mission were critical to whether he and his Soldiers would be successful or not. Throughout the deployment, his firm understanding of operations and concern for the operational environment led to accomplishments and breakthroughs for the Iraqi people and his division with the implementation of governance, civil authorities, and overall improvement of

Leaders at all levels of the Army are faced with difficult decisions every day, decisions that can affect the lives of everyone around them. The thought processes used by individual leaders to make decisions can be as far reaching as their imagination; however, it is every leader’s responsibility to make these decisions using the tenants of mission command. Mission command is not an easy skill to master, however great leaders understand it and the proper use of it when planning a mission. Mission command is broken down into six major principles: Build cohesive teams through trust, create a shared understanding, provide a clear commanders’ intent, exercise-disciplined initiative, use mission orders and accept prudent risk . General Douglas

The ALlies main strategy was to land amphibious and airborne forces on the Normandy coast between Le Havre and the Cotentin peninsula, with successful establishment of a beachhead with adequate ports. They planned for this operation for two years. From the beginning Eisenhower knew knew that air power would be a critical success in the

General Patton, in the Battle of the Bulge exercised the principles of mission command to the fullest and they yielded significantly great results for the Allied forces. General Patton employed each of the principles in different ways in order to ensure that the German surprise attack did not significantly set back the Allied forces in the war. The exercise of mission command allows a commander to conduct military operations and missions through dispersed execution. According to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command, the definition of mission command is “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations”. General Patton exhibited four of the mission command principles extremely well during the Battle of the Bulge.

Juno Beach is your primary objective, you will rush the beachheads at 6:30 on Monday the 5th. Naval support will be provided by Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay and his naval fleet. Aerial bombardment will begin the evening of Monday the 5th, which will leave only German battlements for you to destroy. These are imperative for the invasion of German-occupied Europe. Your respective commanders will have details for you about the LCVP.

Scribbles on Scrap: A Mission Command Analysis of the Battle of the Little Bighorn The massacre at the Little Bighorn in 1876 was one of the most recognizable battles in American history. The defeat of the 7th Cavalry Regiment and the slaughter of 268 Soldiers by the Sioux serves as an enduring subject of study for contemporary military professionals. The basic modus operandi for command principles in the times of the Indian Wars loosely mirrors the mission command philosophy of today; however, if we still lay credence to the efficacy of the mission command philosophy, how was it that a conventional force under the direction of a battle proven leader was defeated by an irregular enemy? In the end, Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer’s complacent

By definition, “mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations,” according to ADRP 5-0. Mission command is about knowing when to change the task to fit the purpose. This paper is intended to analyze the mission command of one side of the battle, focusing on the commander’s role in the operations process. The Battle of Bunker Hill was the most important battle of the American Revolution because of Colonel Prescott’s superior command and control.

On August 19th, 1942, nearly 5,000 Allied troops, mostly Canadians, launched a surprise attack on the French port of Dieppe. The raid was an utter disaster, with nearly half of the Allied troops killed or captured. Despite the heavy losses, the Dieppe Raid provided valuable lessons for the Allies in planning for future amphibious assaults. It taught them about the importance of thorough planning and reconnaissance, proper coordination between the troops and the Navy, and the need for overwhelming air and artillery support. These lessons would prove to be invaluable during the planning of the invasion of Normandy and the ultimate success of the Allied forces.

Returning to the 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) to assume command as the brigade commander brings me much joy to be reunited with great Non-Commission Officers and Officers that I have previously served with. Unfortunately, this brigade is no longer the brigade I remember when I commanded a battalion within the 4th ABCT not so long ago. In the last 30 days, I have had the opportunity to observe the ABCT and review a multitude of historical documents to assess the state of the brigade. During my observation, I believe the critical leadership problem in the 4th ABCT’s is the lack of vision for the brigade. Therefore, this critical problem has led to other challenging issues within the brigade.

The U.S. Army demands that all its members be accountable for their actions, equipment, records, duties and even for their fellow warriors. Planning for operations, especially during times of war, stresses the importance of